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ABSTRACT
The relationship between U.S. and U.S.S.R. arms
transfers to Third World nations and its effects on the
maintenance of regime stability was examined. This study
uses the focused comparison approach to examine three U.S.
cases (Vietnam 1960-1975, the Philippines 1950-1989, and El
Salvador 1960-1989) and three U.S.S.R. cases (Afghanistan
1950-1969, Vietna. 1976-1989, and Nicaragua 1979-1989). The
U.S. and the Soviet cases were chosen due to the intuitive
similarities found in the supplier nation's involvement with
the recipient Third World nation. The trend in the amounts
of arms transfers was determined in each of the cases and
compared to the resulting levels of internal threat,
external threat, and overall level of regime stability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this thesis is to compare U.S. and
U.S.S.R. arms transfers, specifically focusing on the
effect on the maintenance of regime stability in the
recipient nation. A vital aspect of U.S. and U.S.S.R.
relationships with other nations is the transfer of arms and
in some cases sustained military presence in the recipient
nation. It appears that much of U.S. and Soviet support
centers on the belief that continued military presence and
continued arms transfers to foreign governments preserves
the recipient nation's political stability and national
security.
Recent world events continue to show the volatility of
many regimes. The U.S. and the Soviet Union have invested
heavily in economic and military aid to several third world
nations in pursuit of national interests. These national
interests may include but are not limited to securing
strategic access, maintaining influence within the recipient
nation and the region, and fostering ideological
institutions. In a brief review of the existing literature
there appears to be some cases where arms transfers and the
maintenance of regime stability are correlated [Ref. 1].
However, the broad nature and extent of this correlation is
unclear. This paper by examining specific cases will seek
to reveal in a broad scope the efficacy of U.S. and Soviet
arms transfers for the maintenance of regime stability in
the third world.
A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REGIME STABILITY
From 1957-1973 the United States provided aid to Jordan.
During this period Jordan was experiencing external
conflicts and much internal upheaval. The arms that the
United States supplied satisfied the demands of the military
faction within Jordan. The military wanted arms in order to
maintain their identity and self-respect as the defenders of
the nation against both foreign and domestic enemies. With
U.S. arms the military maintained their support for the
monarchy and their loyalty to the King. This maintained
regime stability in Jordan. [Ref. 1: p. 189, 203]
The dnited States has long maintained support tn the
Republic of Korea. This support included financial aid, arms
transfers, and a sustained presence of U.S. combat forces.
The I.S. relationship with South Korea has allowed its
regimes to survive a war and a long uneasy truce with
North Korea. [Ref. 2]
The United States relationship with Jordan and the
Republic of Korea demonstrates that one result of arms
transfers can be the maintenance of regime stability. These
cases represented different time frames, geographic regions,
economic considerations, and military circumstances for both
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the supplier and the recipient nation. These cases seem to
share a significant common factor in that th3 United States
had a vested interest in not letting the regimes fall.
It is necessary to explore the concept of regime
stability. The question must be asked: "Why are both the
United Sates and the Soviet Union, as supplier nations,
interested in the maintenance of regime stability in their
recipient third world nations?"
After World War II the bi-polar structure of the
international environment influenced the direction of U.S.
policy toward economic aid and military support towards the
third world [Ref. 3]. The focus of U.S. aid to the third
world was sustained economic growth and development. The
embodiment of all of these goals toward the third world was
found in the 1984 Kissinger Commission on Central America:
-The elimination of the climate -f violence and strife.
-Development of democratic institutions and processes.
-Development of strong and free economies.
-Development of diversified production for both external
and domestic markets.
-Sharp improvements in the social c 'i+, -f 4ho
poorest Central Americans.
-Substantially improved distribution of income.
[Ref. 4]
Numerous empirical analyses have been conducted
regarding the relationship between the political system and
economic development. It appears that there is a tradeoff
between the political system in use and the achievement of
U.S. aid goals. Some studies reveal that if a less developed
country is going to achieve a high rate of economic growth,
it will have to have a development-oriented authoritarian
regime. This implies that more democratic governments will
simply be too "soft" and consequently be unale to
effectively mobilize resources to achieve a high growth
rate.Two cases that illustrate this idea are found in the
Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China. Both
have maintained authoritarian regimes and have developed
rapidly in their respective capitalist and socialist
systems. [Ref. 5: pp. 14, 15]
The words "modernization" or "development" refer to the
overall processes of social, economic, intellectual,
political, and cultural change that are associated with the
direction of nations from a relatively poor, rural, agrarian
society to a wealthier, urban, industrialized society [Ref.
6,7,81. In order for a society to achieve the goals of
development in either a capitalist or socialist framework,
regime stability is one of many conditions that must be
present [Ref. 5: p. 15].
U.S. and Soviet interests in the maintenance of regime
stability in the third world also include the desire for
both nations to gain some degree of political and economic
influence on the recipient nation and the region surrounding
them. Both U.S. and Soviet arms transfers to third world
regimes hbvo become part of a system of control both
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directly (in the form of military bases agreements) and
indirectly (in the form of collective security agreements)
[Ref. 9; Ref. 10: pp. 6-9].
In many third world nations political power is in the
hands of those with the most firepower. The survival of many
regimes depends on its possession of arms and the
maintenance of a loyal military force. U.S. and Soviet
arms transfers to many third world nations serve to supply
the ruling regime with the most firepower. This supply of
arms ensures the regime's ruling power over any opposition
both external and internal [Ref. 1]. By maintaining the
power of many of these regimes, it is possible that both
U.S. and Soviet lon term national interests can be realized
[h~f. I: pp. 5--9].
In many third world nations the arms are used by a
military faction within the regime to ensure political and
social order. This type of situation reveals the influence
of "praetorianism." Pr aetorianism" as stated in "Decline
and Fall of the Roman Empire" [Ref. 12] refers to a
political situation in which military officers are major or
predominant actors by virtue of actual or threatened use
of force [Ref 13: T. 3]. Thi:s situation is f unI in both
democratic or socialist nations. Chairmin Mao stated that
"power grow:; out o§ *.,. barrel of a gun " arn that the
ultimate power of tne state, as of those w:io might bop- to
overthrow it, lies with the men who possess the rifles,
machine guns, tanks, and planes [Ref. 13: p. 5].
Regime stability is important to the U.S. and the Soviet
Union because it can facilitate the achievement of
development in either a capitalist or socialist system.
Regime stability provides for a check on the internal and
external threats to a government that would prevent
development or cause overthrow and possible anarchy. By
maintaining certain regimes in power through arms transfers
the supplier nation may achieve its long term national
interests both in the recipient nation and the surrounding
region.
B. HYPOTHESES
Research was based on the following hypotheses:
1) If U.S. and U.S.S.R. arms transfers increase to a
recipient third world nation, then the recipient
nation is likely to see an increase in its regime
stability.
2) The greater the amount of U.S. and U.S.S.R. arms
transfers, the greater the decline in external and
internal threats to the recipient third world reqime.
In view of the recent U.S. and U.S.S.R. involvements in
Vietnam and Afghanistan respectively, these hypotheses may
seem intuitively obvious. Arms transfer literature implies
in some cases that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union
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proceed on a course based on the proposition that increasing
the amount of arms transfers increases the regime stability.
The purpose of this paper is to examine this belief using
empirical evidence from six cases. [Ref. 14: p. 11]
C. THE FOCUSED COMPARISON APPROACH
This study is not intended to be a statistical analysis
of U.S. and U.S.S.R. arms transfers to the third world. The
focused comparison approach [Ref. 15: p. 10] will be used.
This method examines a set number of cases and asks a set of
standardized and general questions of each case.The
questions asked will represent either independent or
dependent variables.
The focused comparison approach will examine three U.S.
cases and three Soviet cases. The unit of analysis in each
case will be a supplier-recipient pair for specific time
periods. These time periods are representative of the
years of major U.S. and Soviet involvement with the
recipient nation. The U.S. cases will be: Vietnam
(1960-1975), the Philippines (1950-1989), and El Salvador
(1960-1989). The U.S.S.R. cases will be: Afghanistan
(1960-1989), Vietnam (1976-1989), and Nicaragua (1979-1989).
The U.S. cases and the Soviet cases were selected due
to the intuitive similarities found in the supplier nation's
involvement with the recipient third world nation. Each U.S.
case will have a corresponding Soviet case. The U.S. cases
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will be examined separately from the Soviet cases. The
following shows the intuitive similarities between the U.S.
and Soviet cases:
1) U.S.-Vietnam (1960-1975)/U.S.S.R.-Afghanistar (1960-
1989). Both nations were supplied with arms from
their earliest days of independence. The supplier
nation sent large numbers of combat troops into the
recipient nation. Both suppliers withdrew combat
forces but continued to supply arms to support the
regime.
2) U.S.-Philippines (1950-1989)/U.S.S.R.-Vietnam (1976-
1989). Both suppliers maintain bases and troops in
the recipient nation. Arms transfers are used to
maintain regime stability while ensuring access to
base. . Possession of military bases also ensures a
continued influence in the recipient nation and the
surrounding region.
3) U.S.-El Salvador (1960-1989)/U.S.S.R.-Nicaragua
(1979-1989). Both of the suppliers to the two
Central American nations do so to foster their
ideological compatibility. Neither supplier has
bases or maintains combat troops in the recipient
nation.
Each case will be presented by a graph showing the total
U.S. dollar value of arms transferred in each year of the
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case's time period. The total U.S. dollar amounts of arms
transferred by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union will
be the measurement of value for each case. It is expected
that the graphs will show peaks and valleys in the amounts
of arms transferred.
The level of each case's internal and external threats,
as perceived primarily by the supplier, will be examined
over each case's time period. The determination of the level
of internal and external threat will focus on the years
showing peaks in the amount of arms transferred. From the
overall levels of internal and external threat, the
resulting overall level of regime stability will be
determined for each case. The dependent variables are:
internal threat, external threat, and regime stability. The
independent variable is: total U.S. dollar value of arms
transferred. The specific variables and level determination
will be explained later in greater detail.
D. DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The dependent variables will be categorized as either
high or low. The perceptions will be based primarily from
the view of the supplier. The following shows how the level
of the dependent variables is determined in each case:
Variable Level
Internal Threat High: Incieasirig number of insurgents.
Increasing number of political
9
assassinations.
Increasing number of coup attempts
or successes.
Increasing number of political and
military factionalism.
Majority of military forces fight
insurgents and repress political
opposition.
Low: Few or decreasing number of
organized insurgents.





Military not involved in major
anti-insurgent of political
repression operations.
External Threat High: Attacks by foreign military
forces.
High potential of foreign
military invasion.
Low: No hostilities with foreign
nations.
Few attacks or incidents with
10
foreign military forces.
Regime Stability High: Transition of government power
by constitutional means or by
the use of established orderly
political mechanisms.




established treaties with the
supplier nation.
The leadership and the regime
is in little danger of falling.
Low: The government is on the verge
of being overthrown by internal
or external forces.
The government or the military
is unable to maintain political,
economic, and social order.
No individual or organization
is firmly in charge.
By determining in each case the level of internal
threat, external threat, and the resulting regime stability,
the method of focused comparison assures that data from the
various cases are comparable (Ref. 14: p. 16].
11
E. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
The independent variable is the total U.S. dollar value
of U.S. and Soviet arms transfers to the recipient third
world nation. There is a wide variety of data available on
the quantity of U.S. and Soviet arms transfers. Some records
cover a span from 1950 to 1989. The most comprehensive data
is given in 1987 U.S. dollar values [Ref. 16]. The U.S.
dollar amounts for a specific year vary somewhat from source
to source due to current dollar value conversions, liberal
rounding to even dollar amounts, and the arms programs
included to derive the total dollar amount. The same
inconsistencies are found with the value totals for Soviet
arms transfers.
The total arms transfer amount for the U.S. cases will
be determined by adding the following values for each year
in the case's time period: Foreign Military Sales
Agreements, Commercial Sales, Military Assistance Programs,
Military Assistance Service Funds (Military Departments),
Excess Defense Articles Program, and International Military
Education and Training Program [Ref. 16: p. iv]. The total
Soviet arms transfer amounts are usually given as one value
per year and are not broken down into specific components
[Ref. 17]. For the purposes of this paper it is more
important to emphasize the general quantitative patterns in
the amount of arms transferred. Establishing the trend of
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arms transfer values within the case's time period is the
major objective or the independent variable.
F. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
The hypotheses will be tested by using a matrix. There
will be a matrix presented after the U.S. cases and the
Soviet cases are analyzed.The levels of internal threat,
external threat, and the resulting level of regime stability
will be determined by matching historical events within the
recipient nation to the trend in the amounts of arms
transferred. The columns of the matrix will contain (from
left to right): case and period, internal threat, external
threat, regime stability, and trend of amount of arms
transferred. The hypotheses will be true if the increases
in the amounts of arms transferred correspond to an increase
in regime stability. The following is a sample matrix:
CASE & INTERNAL EXTERNAL REGIME TREND OF
PERIOD THREAT THREAT STABILITY TRANSFERS
U.S./VIET.
1960-1975 HIGH HIGH LOW INCREASING
U.S./PHIL.
1950-1989 HIGH LOW LOW INCREASING
The matrix will also show the levels of internal threat and
external threat and its relationship to the trend in arms
transfers for the case's time perir...
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II. U.S. CASES
The U.S. cases are: Vietnam (1960-1975), the Philippines
(1950-1989), and El Salvador (1960-i989). These cases were
chosen because of the similar foundations and relationship
characteristics between the supplier and the recipient
third world nation. These cases were also chosen because
they appear to represent the broad scope and extent of arms
transfers to the third world, allowing greater
generalization. The extent of U.S. arms transfers spans
much of the history of the recipient nation since their
gaining of independence and subsequent regime formations.
A. VIETNAM (1960-1975)
From World War II to 1975,in an unprecedented effort to
shape and control a country's political character, the power
of the United States was for over thirty years projected
into Vietnam [Ref. 1: p. x-xi]. The first and foremost
reason for U.S. involvement in Vietnam was the U.S. desire
to prevent the government of South Vietnam from becoming
a Communist state [Ref. 1: p. x; Ref. 2: p. 4].
The building of a separate anti-communist state in South
Vietnam demanded a continuing U.S. effort focused on shaping
the Saigon government into an instrument supportive of both
U.S. strategic and geopolitical objectives r 1: x;
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Ref. 2: p. 5]. In order to establish a non-communist
government in southern Vietnam it was necessary to support
any Saigon regime against internal threats and direct
aggression from Communist North Vietnamese armed forces
[Ref. 2: p. 7]. Since the formation of South Vietnam under
the frail leadership of Bao Dai in July 1954, the U.S.
recognized that democratic, economic, and social d&velopment
could only be achieved with massive U.S. military aid to
the Saigon regime [Ref. 2: p. 6; Ref. 3: p. 13].
1. ARMS TRANSFERS
U.S. commitment to the government of South Vietnam
started with the Eisenhower administration. In 1955, U.S.,
French and Vietnamese officials agreed in Saigon that the
U.S. would assume full responsibilities for training and
arming the armed forces of South Vietnam. In 1960, under the
Kennedy administration, arms transfers to South Vietnam
increased steadily as the Saigon government under Ngo
Dinn Diem, who deposed Bao Dai, began organizing the
legitimate armed forces of South Vietnam. [Ref. 3: p. QQ]
The first large scale arms transfers occurred in
1963. In November of 1963 the Diem regime was overthrown in
a military coup. Diem was killed. After a series of
successive coups, General Nguyen Van Thieu became chief of
state with General Nguyen Cao Ky as premier in 1965. [Ref.
3: p. 181; Ref. 4,5]
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The first year of direct large scale U.S. combat
involvement in Vietnam against Viet Cong insurgents and
North Vietnamese forces occurred in 1965. U.S. arms
transfers continued to soar during the years of direct U.S.
military forces involvement from 1965 to 1973. With the
withdrawal of U.S. combat forces in 1973, there was a
dramatic decline in arms transfers to the Saigon government.
[Ref. 3: p. 220]. The end was near. Table 1 shows the





YEAR FMS C/S MAP MASF EDAP IMET TOTAL
1960 5 - 86326 - 4495 4837 95699
1961 - - 87037 - 11713 6975 105725
1962 - - 160680 - 21477 11318 193475
1963 - - 176792 - 24812 17591 219195
1964 - - 169061 - 10951 15756 414963
1965 - - 223259 - 84535 14603 322897
1966 - - 89510 551275 40824 8870 690479
1967 - - - 647440 15113 - 662553
1968 - - - 964887 278460 - 1243347
1969 2 - - 1250762 283218 - 1533980
1970 - - - 1469019 99296 - 1568315
1971 - - - 1863827 37590 - 1901417
1972 2 - - 2292034 47891 - 2339925
1973 1155 - - 3246675 79800 - 3326475
1974 4 - - 772622 14342 - 786946
1975 - - - 543698 30 - 543728
*Compiled from Department of Defense, Security Assistance
Agency, Fiscal Year Series as of September 30 L 1987,
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1987.
The case evidence is examined to see if increases in
arms transfers follows U.S. perceptions in the regime's
ability to resist threats imposed by internal dissent,
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insurgency, and aggression from North Vietnam [Ref. 2: p.
428]. Figure 1 is a graph that represents the total amounts
of U.S. arms transferred from 1960 to 1975.
Figure 1*
1960-1975 Total Arms Transfers






1960 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
*Compiled from Department of Defense, Security Assistance
Agency, Fiscal Year Series as of September 30, 1987,
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1987.
2. Internal Threat
After overthrowing the Bao Dai government in 1954,
the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem consolidated its power by
suppressing political opposition. Confronted with the
inability to achieve any progress on the South Vietnamese
people's demands for economic and political reform, internal
opposition mounted. In 1960 former Diem cabinet ministers
formed the first legal opposition party and rallied the
populace behind charges that the Diem regime was adopting
"dictatorial Communist-like methods" to ensure "one party
rule." [Ref. 6]
In 1960, the Vietminh rebels and other mostly
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Communist oriented rebel groups formed a formal
pro-Communist organization, the National Liberation Front.
This organization later came to be known as the Viet Cong
(VC). Viet Cong strength grew rapidly in the southern
countryside. The U.S. government did not believe the
insurgent strength reported by the Diem regime but instead
relied heavily on the estimates made by the U.S. Military
Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) stationed in South
Vietnam [Ref. 8]. It was impossible to get an accurate
count of VC strength in South Vietnam,but both the U.S. and
the Saigon government agreed on the fact that the VC threat
was growing in numbers and firepower [Ref. 9: p. 5].
The Johnson administration in July of 1965 decided
to proceed with a major escalatory step to comp1liment
increased arms supplies. President Johnson and his advisors
made the decision to commit large numbers of U.S. ground
forces. The decision was partly based on the belief that
the South Vietnamese armed forces were unable to check the
internal threat on their own regardless of the amount of
drm transfers. The period of 1966-1973 represented the
total "Americanization" of the war which involved ever
increasing numbers of men, until the president called a halt
at more than half a million American troops. [Ref. 1: p.
366; Ref. 2: p. 218-221].
Throughout the period of 1960-1975 the internal
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threat as posed mainly by the VC grew in organization,
numbers, foreign support, and determination to achieve final
victory. Despite the enormous U.S. investment up to that
point, the last Saigon government made many of the same
pleas for help as it did in 1960. The regime in the hands
of Vice President Huong still had no real control over the
people or countryside [Ref. 10: p. 10-12].
3. External Threat
Since the partition of Vietnam in 1954, the
government of the north under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh
sought to reunite the country under Communist rule. The
U.S. from the Eisenhower to the Nixon administration
perceived the threat from North Vietnam to be one of total
commitment to seize control of the South. The commitment
was no less intense than North Korea's attempt to conquer
the South in 1950. [Ref. 9: p. 1]
The evidence given from all of Saigon's regimes and
the U.S. military advisors in country from the 1959 to 1965
showed that the hard core of the Communists forces attacking
South Vietnam were trained, armed, and ordered into the
South by the Hanoi government. The evidence also showed
that the types of weapons and ammunition delivered to the
Communists forces fighting in the South must have come from
suppliers outside of North Vietnai. The p z:y sappliers
were the People's Republic of China and other Communist
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states and only channeled their weapons through North
Vietnam. All of these facts gave credibility to the
so-called "domino theory." The U.S. believed that if South
Vietnam were to fall to North Vietnam, other neighboring
Southeast Asian countries would fall under Communist
control. [Ref. 2: p. 95; Ref. 3: p. 70; Ref. 9: p. 1-2]
It was perceived by the U.S. that the government in
Saigon could not survive the gains made by VC and North
Vietnamese forces [Ref. 3: p. 47]. The period 1966 to 1973
saw massive increases in the amounts of arms transfers to
the Saigon government. From the 1967 to 1969 the Saigon
government was able to maintain control only in some of
the areas surrounding the central regions of the country
near Saigon but continued to grossly miscalculate VC
and North Vietnamese resilience and strength [Ref. 2: p.
135]. Even at the peak year of U.S. arms transfers to the
Saigon government and massive U.S. bombing in the north, the
North Vic=tnamese armed forces continued to strengthen its
infiltration and military successes in the south [Ref. 11].
4. Regime Stability
Beginning with the partition of Vietnam in 1954, the
south was unable to form an effective and cohesive
government. This was in extreme contrast to the government
in Hanoi. In 1960 the Saigon government was under the
control of the Diem regime. At first Diem was liked by ti e
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south's nationalists, but Diem soon resorted to extreme
repression of all opposition to ensure his hold on power
[Ref. 6]. Diem's government was overtly co7zrupt and was
unable to gain any economic or social developments. The
government faced widespread political opposition,
particularly from the Buddhist faction [Ref. 1: p. 189]. The
war against the VC and North Vietnamese forces was
escalating.
After several previous coup attempts, the Diem
regime was overthrown in November 1963. Diem was
assassinated by members of the military loyal to the new
leader, General Duong Van Minh. General Minh did not support
the manner in which the U.S. was conducting the war. He
opposed bombing of the north and increases in U.S. military
advisers in the south. Minh maintained that any increased
American presence would have serious adverse political
consequences for the people of South Vietnam. Backed by the
U.S., General Khanh deposed Minh in January 1964. Among the
top members of the Saigon officer corps, the U.S. reg'rded
Khanh as the general most "cooperative of U.S. policy."
[Ref: 1: p. 188, 189]
After General Khahn a series of negotiations
resulted in the transfer of government to Premier Phanh
Quat early in 1965. In June of that year Pr mier Quat
handed over responsibility and power to the armed forces. A
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military triumvirate headed by General Nguyen Van Thieu
assumed control of government. General Thieu became chief
of state and General Nguyen Cao Ky became premier. [Ref. 12:
p. 209].
As U.S. arms transfers and direct military
involvement increased steadily from 1960 to 1966, the
political situation became more and more confused. As each
successive regime assumed power, each promised more
economic development and an end to the war. In 1966, South
Vietnam was plagued with growing civil uprisings by
Bhuddhists, mass protests, general strikes, anti-Ky and
anti-U.S. demonstrations. [Ref. 13, 14]
In September 1967, Thieu and Ky were elected
president and vice-president respectively. Their regime
show d little progress toward ending the insurgency and the
expanding war with North Vietnam. Political, economic, and
military problems mounted throughout the 1967-1975
period. The Thieu regime was unable to prevent gains by the
Communist forces. He maintained power by his firm control
of the military. Yet, the confusion that was found in
Saigon in 1963 to 1965 continued throughout the years
of the Thieu regime. The regime was corrupt and ineffective
in all aspects of government. The major problem in Saigon,
that no amount of arms transfers could save, was that no one
in Saigon was ever legitimately in charge. U.S. policy
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toward South Vietnam was fundamentally flawed. It counted on
"helping the government in Saigon when no government in fact
existed." [Ref 1: p. 419,432; Ref. 10: p. 10; Ref. 15]
5. Case Assessment
The period from 1960 to 1967 saw a gradual increase
in the amounts of arms transfers. A sharp increase occurred
in 1968 and rose rapidly to the 1973 peak. The dramatic
drop in arms transfers corresponded to the withdrawal of all
U.S. combat forces from Vietnam. The period that showed the
rapid increase corresponded to the "Americanization" of the
war. Arms transfers showed an overall increasing trend.
Throughout the entire period from 1960 to 1975 the
government of South Vietnam was confronted with the same
growing internal threats. The Communist VC insurgency
continued to grow in numbers, organization, strength,
firepower, and resolve to defeat any Saigon government. All
regimes were repressive to any political opposition. The
period saw continued general strikes, anti-government, and
anti-U.S. demonstrations. There was a definite existence of
a "praetorian" state. Those who maintained the loyalties of
the military maintained control of government.All regimes
were unable to achieve economic, political, or social
development. The overall internal threat from 1960 to 1975
is categorized as high.
The external threat to South Vietnam had grown ever
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since the country was partitioned in 1954. The Communist
forces of North Vietnam maintained continued growth in
manpower, firepower, and infiltration into the south. The
Hanoi government received the backing of the People's
Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and other Communist
Block nations. The Hanoi government was resolute in
defeating the south. Hanoi achieved the final victory after
an enormous struggle in April 1975. The overall external
threat throughout the time period is categorized as high.
The 1960-1975 period saw more than eight separate
regimes fall. There were numerous coup attempts throughout
the period. Each regime was characterized by corruption and
ineffectiveness in seeing an end to the war or achieving any
kind of national development. The regime maintained power
by ensuring the loyalties of the military leadership and by
keeping in step with all U.S. policies toward the Vietnam
conflict. All regimes in fact had no real control over the
country or its people.
The governments of Saigon have been described as
being nothing more than suits of armor like those found
standing in museums [Ref. 11]. U.S. arms transfers
represent the suits of armor and appear strong and
formidable. But all the armor suits are hollow. They all
must be propped-up and are delicately pieced together. One
kick is all it takes for the hollow suit to come crashing
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down. The U.S. involvement focused on maintaining a
government that did not actually have control over a
nation. The overall regime stability is categorized as low.
B. PHILIPPINES (1960-1989)
Since the destruction of the Spanish fleet by the United
States naval forces at Manila Bay and the subsequent victory
in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States has
been firmly entrenched in the Philippines. From these roots
the U.S.-Philippine alliance has evolved into a "special
relationship." It has been a strong and enduring
relationship. The heart of the alliance has been the
Philippine dependence upon the United States. In
particular, the Philippines has relied almost entirely upon
the United States for arms supplies since its gaining of
independence in 1946. This fact seems to underscore the
strong ties between the broad regional U.S. interests and
the maintenance of Philippine government security.[Ref.16J
Vital to the U.S.-Philippine relationship is the
transfer of arms and the significant U.S. military presence
on the islands. The American military presence has had
political, social, and economic impact. It is this presence
that realizes the U.S. commitment to forward defense. U.S.
presence thus far has been compatible to both U.S. and
Philippine interest. U.S. support to the Manila regimes has
centered on the belief on both sides that continued military
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presence and continued arms transfers to the Philippine
government contibutes to political stability and national
security. [Ref. 17]
1. Arms Transfers
The U.S. military presence in the Philippines was
based on the provisions of the 1946 Treaty of General
Relations Between the United States and the Republic of the
Philippines. This document granted independence to the
Philinpines and also reserved access to military bases in
the Philippines. In 1951 the Military Assistance Agreement
and the Mutual Defense Treaty were signed. The preamble to
the 1947 Military Bases Agreement stated that in the
interest of mutual defense, the U.S. would be allowed to use
the designated bases "free of rent." From the very
beginnings of this agreement the U.S. has "voluntarily"
offered the Philippine government compensation in the form
of military and economic aid. [Ref. 18]
The largest amounts of arms transfers during the
1950's were delivered from 1950 to 1955. This corresponded
to the formation of the Philippine armed forces. The period
of the 1960's to the early 1970's saw gradual transfers
until the peak of 1977. The late 1970's and the early
1980's showed moderate levels until the dramatic rise in
1988. Table 2 shows the amounts transferred during the




(columns in 1987 U.S.$1000 and Totals in 1989 dollars)
YEAR FMS C/S MAP EDAP IMET TOTALS
1950 1 62 - 13817 4250 583 19378
1951 183 - 22162 199 438 23671
1952 474 - 47348 2529 552 52430
1953 481 - 13090 2657 1010 17755
1954 315 - 3350 764 450 5025
1955 185 - 9561 2247 639 13011
1956 15 - 29625 3987 857 35521
1957 711 - 7069 1513 2489 12135
1958 576 - 8445 22679 2398 35121
1959 409 - 22402 4621 1729 3036
1960 48 - 33250 4102 755 39249
1961 212 - 31933 2992 1968 38218
1 962 236 - 8030 1988 2510 13147
1963 206 - 14902 494 2689 18840
1964 36 - 18947 1586 2297 23552
1965 260 - 20565 766 1359 23693
1966 137 - 21045 718 1146 23737
1967 439 - 25188 3674 909 31116
1968 237 - 19620 1625 1327 23493
1969 454 - 15991 1885 1051 19962
1970 825 - 14633 3638 786 20550
1971 1107 596 14634 2255 985 20164
1972 468 290 12977 2085 988 17312
1973 1159 187 15903 15654 815 34730
1974 3863 1966 14822 2336 574 24268
1975 28155 2942 18628 1374 405 53050
1976 33713 11768 18451 5026 848 71900
1977 63972 14082 15674 726 594 97899
1978 27464 7184 17230 37 713 54207
1979 17935 5589 15925 38 646 41337
1980 10617 7954 25186 1 529 45617
1981 6026 967 24964 - 398 33326
1982 15460 1000 746 - 1129 18885
1983 18117 5859 621 - 1296 26670
1984 11636 4018 741 - 1462 18393
1985 38423 11566 - - 2205 53760
1986 56640 2224 10000 - 2371 73372
1987 107726 4856 - - 2550 118592
1988 133124 7328 - - 2626 147370
1989 - - - 126613
*Compiled from Fiscal Year Series as of September 30, 1988.,
COMUSNAVPHIL, Press Briefs, July 1988, September 1989.
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The amount of arms transfers are somewhat consistent
but show dramatic rises in certain years. The case needs to
be examined to see if these rises follows U.S. perceptions
of the threats to the Manila regimes. Figure 2 is a graph
showing the totals transferred in the period.
Figure 2*
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*Compiled from Fiscal Year Series as of September 30, 1987.
2. Internal Threat
The period bLwfen 1950 to 1959 marked the
beginnings of the Philippine recovery from World War II.
The island nation gained its independence in 1946 and
quickly moved to establish its democratic foundations.
Almost immediately the newly formed democracy found a
growing opposition from peasant guerrillas. These
guerrillas, largely influenced and backed by the growing
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Communist movement in the Far East, organized into a potent
military force threatening the elected regimes of the
fifties. These groups of guerrillas were known as the Huks.
Another group of insurgents gained influence as an
organized front in the 1950's. This group had fought for
autonomy since the Spaniards imposed their rule in the
1600's. They were the two rival Moslem groups - the
mainstream Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the
Muslim Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
The newly organized Philippine armed forces were
quickly confronted with a significant number of well
organized and armed opposition force of Huk guerrillas in
the northern islands and Muslim guerrillas in the southern
island of Mindanao.The largest delivery of U.S. arms during
the 1950's came in 1952. This corresponded to the U.S.
pledge to back the Manila regime with arms to combat
anti-government forces on Luzon and Mindanao (Ref. 19].
During the 1950's major confrontations occurred
between Muslim guerrillas and Philippine army forces. 5000
Muslim guerrillas attacked battalion sized Philippine army
units throughout the southern islands. In the northern
islands the Huk guerrillas started urban terrorist
operations that were successful in assassinating key
political figures. [Ref. 20]
The Huk insurgency transformed into a new
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organization in the early 1960's. The Communist movement
took a new armed stance in the formation of the New People's
Army (NPA). Like the Huks this force used guerrilla tactics
against government troops in the countryside and terrorist
tactics in the urban areas. By the mid-1970's the Communist
insurgency grew especially in the northern provinces. Though
no accurate numbers exist the estimated strength of the NPA
reached 40,000 members [Ref. 21].
The MNLF forces in Mindanao also intensified and
grew in numbers. Moslem rebels in Mindanao were covertly
being supported by Islamic nations, in particular, Libya. In
1977 negotiations were conducted between the Philippine
government uiider President Marcos and the MNLF in Tripoli,
Libya. After a few months the talks were discontinued
because of the persistent demands by the MNLF for the
independence of Mindanao and other Islamic regions of the
Philippines. [Ref. 22]
In 1972, President Marcos declared a state of
martial law. This was in response to the intensifying
insurgency, the widespread corruption and lawlessness
throughout the country, and the growing political opposition
to his regime [Ref. 23]. By the late 1970's the Marcos
regime was faced with severe inflation and other economic
difficulties. The Marcos government negotiated a new
Military Bases Agreement (MBA) in December of 1976. The U.S.
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agreed to give the Marcos regime over a billion dollars in
military and economic assistance. Much of this assistance
was given in order to finance the largest military build-up
in Philippine history tor the purpose of combating the
insurgency and to strengthen the regime's hold on power
[Ref. 24].
The period of the 1980's saw much internal turmoil.
The Communist and Muslim insurgencies were still gaining
strength and support in the countryside. The political
opposition to the Marcos regime was increasingly becoming
more intensified. Pressures were placed upon the Marcos
regime to reinstate constitutional rights and free
elections. The force that finally brought the Marcos regime
down was the combined political forces under the leadership
of Mrs. Corazon Aquino, the wife of the slain long-time
opposition leader, Begnino Aquino [1ef. 25].
The Aquino regime quickly inherited all of the
problems faced by the ousted regime, namely the growing NPA
and MNLF insurgencies, an extremely poor economy, political
opposition by Marcos loyalists, several coup attempts, and a
continually suspect military element [Ref. 26,27,28]. The
Aquino regime negotiated a new MBA in 1987. zquino claimed
that one of the reasons for the higher price of U.S.
compensation was the growing expense needed to counter the
insurgent forces. President Aquino complained that the U.S.
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"expected the Philippine forces to fight with only teeth and
hands." [Ref. 28]
3. External Threat
The period 1950 to 1989 saw little direct external
threat to the Philippines as perceived by both the U.S. and
the Philippines. The 1950's experienced the U.S.
intervention in Korea. The People's Republic of China was
in Korea and Communist forces defeated the French in
Vietnam. The Mutual Defense Agreement of 1951 guaranteed
Philippine security in case of attack from another country,
in particular the People's Republic of China. Subsequent
agreements, the Manila Pact of 1954 and the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization (SEATO), later served to solidify the
U.S. assurances of a "umbrella of protection" for the
region [Ref. 1: p.71].
During the 1960's the U.S. significantly increased
its involvement in Southeast Asia. With the growing U.S.
actions in Vietnam, the Philippine bases became important
logistics assets. President Eisenhower in 1960 explicitly
restated U.S. assurances that an armed attack on the
Philippines would involve an armed attack on the U.S. forces
stationed there and would instantly be repelled. Eisenhower
pledged the intensification of military cooperation with
respect to SEATO and continued military assistance programs
to further Philippine defense capability in "light of modern
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requirements and the threat to the Far East posed by China."
[Ref. 29]
One of the only direct external threats, though
very small in scale, during the 1980's has been Chinese and
Vietnamese forces on the Spratley Islands. The Philippine
government explored the areas surrounding the Spratley
Islands and exchanged gunfire [Ref. 24, 30].
4. Regime Stability
During the period of the 1950' the U.S. helped to
secure the position of secretary of defense for their own
candidate, Ramon Magsaysay. The U.S. consequently helped to
ensure his election as president. While he held these
positions the U.S. cooperated effectively with him to
suppress the Communist Huk insurgency. [Ref. 1: p. 70]
The 1960's also saw a period of relative political
stability. Elections were ccndcted regularly and the
transition of government occurred by constitutioaal means.
The advent of the Marcos regime saw the emergence of
relative instability in Philippine government.
The Marcos regime imposed martial law in 1972. The
period was marked by widespread demonstrations, strikes,
armed insurgency, and growing political opposition. The
Marcos regime suppressed constitutional freedoms and
political dissension. Marcos developed a loyal cadre of
military officers and ensured the loyalty of the armed
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forces. The 1977 delivery of U.S. military aid in effect
helped to build a strong and loyal military arm for the
Marcos regime.
The early 1980's saw an appeal for political reform
by the U.S. in view of the growing internal turmoil in the
Philippines. In 1985 and 1986 the U.S. Congress became
involved in the crisis in the Philippines to an extent
unmatched in most other countries during the period.The
election of 1986 brought the opposition leader, Mrs. Aciino
to power. The new Aquino regime immediately faced much of
the same internal turmoil of the Marcos regime. Her regime
from the very beginning was considered extremely fragile.
[Ref. 24: 173-174]
5. Case Assessment
The period of the 1950's saw the emergence of the
armed Communist-backed insurgency and the Mosle-
independence movements. Through the 1960's, 1972', and
1980's the insurgencies have continued to grow in strength
and numbers. Both have continued their large-scale attacks
on government forces and their widespread urban terrorists
attacks. These attacks have centered on key political
figures and have included numerous American military
personnel. The internal threat is categorized as nigh.
The external threat historically has been the
People's Republic of China as perceived by the U.S. Since,
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the involvement of the U.S. in Vietnam and the continued
U.S. troop presence in the Philippines, there is no direct
external threat to the Philippines. The external threat is
categorized as low.
The political opposition intensified under the
Marcos regime. The subsequent Aquino regime has been unable
to achieve any significant political, economic, or social
development and a strong opposition exists. The regime is
faced witn growing inflation, civil strife, a disloyal
military, coup attempts, and corruption in government.
Communist insurgents continue to carry out terrorist acts
against government officials and American military
personnel.
The Aquino government is currently negotiating
(1990) another MBA. There is a growing anti-American
sentiment in the Philippines,not only among elements in the
government but among the Philippine people as well. The
solution to the country's economic, political, and social
problems can not be found in continued increases in U.S.
military and economic aid. The overall regime stability is
categorized as low.
C. EL SALVADOR (1960-1989)
The United Sates has long been interested in its
neighbors to the south. During the course of the twentieth
century the U.S. has landed troops in many of the major
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Central American nations. With the advent of the Panama
Canal the U.S. has maintained a vital interest in keeping
stability in the region. The U.S. has been an influential
force in the internal politics of many nations in Latin
America. [Ref. 32: p. 4]
El Salvador has been such a nation. Throughout this
century the U.S. has been an influential force in the
internal politics and direction of El Salvador. Most
recently, U.S.-El Salvador relations have focused on the
U.S. involvement in that nation's long running civil war.
Much of the U.S. policies toward El Salvador have centered
on the U.S. perception of Cuban and Soviet activities in the
region. The U.S. has made its commitment to support the
government of El Salvador and to prevent it from falling to
the tide of Communist backed insurgencies.In El Salvador,
the U.S. made a commitment to foster democracy, but often
settled simply to achieve political order. [Ref. 32: p. 19;
Ref. 33: p. 51]
1. Arms Transfers
In the early 1960's the Kennedy administration had
given U.S. support to the government of EL Salvador in light
of the Cuban crisis and the desire for the U.S. to maintain
hegemony in the hemisphere [Ref. 34: p. 68] It was also
the goal of the U.S. to foster development in Latin America.
The U.S. maintained the belief that through development much
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of the environment that spawned Communist movements would be
eliminated [Ref. 35: p. 61-74).
Arms transfers were relatively moderate during the
1960's though no democratic institutions were in place in El
Salvador. Most all of the nation's regimes had been led by
army officers. The economic elite ruled the country in close
conjunction with the military. Since 1931, nearly every
president had been an army officer. Periodic elections were
not legitimate. [Ref. 36]
Since the early 1960's the U.S. decided it was
of paramount importance to curb the tide of Communist
insurgencies regardless of the regime's style of rule. The
Communists were a force that "did not play fair." U.S.
military assistance must be used in order to maintain
internal political order [Ref. 37: p. 151]. The primary
purpose of U.S. arms transfers was for the maintenance of
internal security and to check Communist influences so that
the government cou1 focus its efforts on development [Ref.
38: p. 166].
The 1960's and the 1970's saw relatively few
increases in arms transfers. The gradual rise in arms
transfers started in 1979. This corresponded to the Reagan
administration's policies on Central America. Table 3 shows






YEAR FMS C/S MAP EDAP IMET TOTAL
1960 7 - - 3 83 86
1961 67 - - - 217 284
1962 - - 529 2 504 1034
1963 - - 4119 307 58 1484
1964 3 - 619 226 320 1168
1965 18 - 303 68 226 615
1966 35 - 459 131 277 902
1967 15 - 169 9 159 352
1968 514 - 94 55 281 944
1969 6 - 206 8 175 395
1970 - - 352 35 224 611
1971 2 - 47 96 286 431
1972 - - 200 11 255 466
1973 52 - 15 - 492 559
1974 381 - 122 203 437 1143
1975 393 - 560 1268 493 2714
1976 726 - 222 1476 794 3218
1977 146 - 9 34 565 754
1978 9 - 3 - - 12
1979 - - 4 - - 4
1980 2291 - 165 - 244 2700
1981 9842 - 24413 - 1157 35412
1982 15968 - 45228 28 5250 66474
1983 665154 - 33500 - 4984 103638
1984 121146 - 176750 - 3590 301486
1985 138923 - 124750 - 1474 265147
1986 115017 - 120367 - 1440 236824
1987 104926 - 110000 - 1455 216381
Compiled from Fiscal Year Series as of September 30, 1987.
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The rise in arms transfers during the 1980's is also
influenced by the increase in U.S. involvement in what has
become El Salvador's civil war. Figure 3 is a graph that
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*Compiled from Fiscal Year Series as of September 30, 1987.
2. Internal Threat
The year 1961 started with a successful coup. A
group of army officers overthrew the government of President
Jose Lemus and quickly moved to form a military-civilian
junta. The coup was carried out in order to halt the
"leftist excesses" that were continuing to grow in El
Salvador. [Ref. 391
The Kennedy administration backed the regimes of the
early 1960's because each regime announced that it intended
to establish free elections and solve the nation's economic
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and social problems. Kennedy announced that these regimes
were in "consonance with U.S. goals for a free and
prosperous Latin America." These governments continued to
strengthen their repressive apparatus of military,
paramilitary, and police forces. [Ref. 40, 41]
During the 1960's popular organizations of workers,
peasants,and students began forming. These organizations,
opposed to the repressive military rule, became increasingly
radicalized. After the Salvadorean armed forces (SAF)
prevented an elected government from taking control of
power in 1972, the Salvadorean people intensified their
beliefs that there was little hope for change through the
electoral process. The popular organizations expanded as
students, farmers, peasants, and church workers joined
together to lead strikes and demonstrations demanding reform
and an end to the repression. In the late 1970's, the
regime of General Carlos Humberto Romero increased
repression. There was a sharp increase in government
supported right-wing death squads. [Ref. 41: p. 19-22; Ref.
42: p. 2]
The 1980's saw the formation of organized guerrilla
forces dedicated to the downfall of El Salvador's military
regimes. In 1980 several organizations and two
left-of-center political parties (Social Democrats and
Popular Social Christian Movement) formed the Democratic
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Revolutionary Front (FDR). The armed faction of the
resistance movement, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (FMLN) was cteateci to join tne four major guer.ii±a
armies in El Salvador. The FMLN was being supplied with arms
from Communist nations through Nicaragua. [Ref: 36; Ref. 41:
p. 20; Ref. 42: p. 2; Ref. 431
The most potent internal threat to the government of
El Salvador continues to be the growing insurgency of the
FMLN. The main focus of U.S. aid to El Salvador has been to
strengthen the SAF. The U.S. proceeds on the belief that by
strengthening the SAF, a military shield can form,and the
government will be allowed to make progress toward economic
and political development. [Ref. 44]
3. External Threat
Throughout the period of 1960 to 1989 there has been
little direct external threat to El Salvador. The brief war
with Honduras over border disputes was officially ended by
the signing of a peace treaty in 1980. The treaty formed a
basis for resolving any futurc disputes by an International
Court of Justice adjudication. [Ref. 361
There has been a more significant indirect external
threat to the governments of El Salvador. Since the fall of
the Somoza regime in Nicaragua in October of 1979 several
guerrilla armies have used Nicaragua for small bases of
operations, havens, and as a source of arms supplies. Much
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of U.S. support to El Salvador has come from the U.S.
perception that the overthrow of the government of El
Salvador is tne goal of Nicaragua. (Re. 45: p. 131b]
4. Regime Stability
The Kennedy administration gave support to the
governments of El Salvador to prevent the spread of
Communist influence in the hemisphere. Praetorianism has
been an influential force in El Salvador. The transition of
government power since the 1960's have for the most part
been decided by the military.
The major coups occurred in 1961, 1962, 1972, and
1979. In each case the military-civilian juntas made
promises to form legitimately elected governments. In each
case there has been an increase in the amount of civilian
repression. The 1984 election of Duarte saw no improvements.
Citizen resistance movements grew along with the strength of
the Communist supported FMLN and other rebel armnies. Each
regime has at some time declared a state of national
emergency or declared a state of siege to exist.
The period of the 1980's has seen little
improvement in the prospects for long term regime stability.
The regime of President Alfredo Cristiani has declared that
new measures were needed to combat terrorism. Death tolls
have continued to rise as both right and left-wing violence
intensifies. Though U.S. military aid has increased
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throughout the 1980's, aid has been conditioi±al- The
government of El Salvador has had to show improvements in
hu wi riq:iLs, pcostcution of z tay-k - taz aszaszi-n,- ,
on implementing legitimate elections.[Ref. 42: p. 51; Ref.
46; Ref. 47)
5. Case Assessment
The internal threat to the government of El Salvador
has seen an increase in intensity, growth in numbers, and
a rise in casualties on both sides. The FMLN has maintained
armed opposition against government forces. The overall
internal threat is categorized as high.
The external threat has been indirect. External
threat has been in the form of support of insurgent
operations. There appears to be little chance of a direct
invasion from a neighboring force. The overall external
threat is categorized as low.
The praetorian state in El Salvador has resulted in
the success of coups and the resulting military-civilian
juntas. The people have little faith in the election
process. The transition of power has not been accomplished
by constitutional mechanisms. Violence and terrorism has




The U.S.S.R. cases are: Afghanistan (1950-1989), Vietnam
(1976-1989), and Nicaragua (1979-1989). These cases were
chosen because of their intuitive similarities with
corresponding U.S. arms transfer cases. These cases were
also chosen because they appear to represent the broad scope
and extent of Soviet arms transfers to the third world. Like
their corresponding U.S. cases, the Soviets have
supported regimes in order to achieve long term
national interests in the recipient nation and the
region.
A. AFGHANISTAN (1950-1989)
Afghanistan has long played an important role in Russian
expansionist interests since the time of the tsars. From
the nineteenth century onward Afghanistan gained importance
because of its geographical location [Ref. 1: p. 6]. The
Russian tsars through the centuries had pushed their borders
eastward across Siberia and southward into Central Asia
[Ref. 1: p. 6]. At the same time the British were expanding
their empire northward from India. The impending clash was
inevitable. To counter Russian influence in both Persia and
Central Asia Great Britain fought a series of Anglo-Afghan
Wars starting in 1838 [Ref. 2: p. 26].
Time has not changed the geographical importance of
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Afghanistan to Soviet interests in the region. The actors
have changed. After World War II there emerged three
distinct periods of Soviet-Afghan relations that can
characterize Soviet aims in Afghanistan and help to explain
some of the reasons for Soviet determination to maintain
regime stability in this third world nation.The period
1946-1953 represented a traditional balancing of influence
of the world powers with the United States replacing Great
Britain as the counter balance to the Soviet Union. The
period 1953-1963 saw a growing external threat to
Afghanistan from Pakistan and required the Afghan government
to seek assistance from an outside power. The period after
1963 the Soviet Union sought to lessen the influence of the
United States in the region with the emergene- of U.S.
military alliances and pacts. [Ref. 3: p. 11]
1. Arms Transfers
After the break-up of British India, the Soviet
government turned its attention to securing closer relations
with Afghanistan. Closer relations with a regime favorable
to the Soviet Union was essential to stave off possible
encroachment from the West. The Soviets desired to keep
Afghanistan out of a Western alliance system. Nikita
Khrushchev stated that at the time of his December 1955
visit to Kabul, it was clear that the Americans were
penetrating Afghanistan with the obvious purpose of setting
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up a military base for intelligence collection operations.
[Ref. 4: p. 74; Ref. 5]
Afghanistan had been historically non-aligned until
1953. Afghanistan and Pakistan were in a border dispute over
the Pashtunistan territory.The Afghan government under Prime
Minister Daoud had asked for American military aid to update
an army which consisted of World War I bi-planes and
horse-drawn artillery [Ref. 4: p. 80; Ref. 6: p. 4]. The
Eisenhower administration annoyed by Afghanistan's
historical insistence on non-alignment, its refusal to sign
the Baghdad Pact, and its dispute over border areas with
Pakistan, turned down Daoud [Ref. 6: p. 4]. The regime of
Mohammed Daoud decided to seek the Soviet Union's
assistance and support [Ref. 4: p. 75; Ref. 6: p. 4].
The Soviets, after nearly 150 years of waiting,
quickly seized the opportunity to start their way into Kabul
and the Afghan government [Ref. 6: p. 4]. In 1954 the
Soviets provided the Afghans with $3.5 million in military
and economic assistance [Ref. 1: p. 24]. In 1955 the Soviets
dramatically increased support by granting the Afghans $100
million in military aid and economic assistance to be
sread over a seven year period [Ref. 1: p. 24].
Arms transfers have shown a steady increase
throughout the 1960's and 1970's with its most dramatic rise
corresponding to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
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1979. The case will examine the gaining of Soviet inroads
through arms transfers. These inroads include the equipping
of the Afghan armed forces, penetrating the officer corps,
building a strategic highway system, and gaining control of
the nation's resources [Ref. 6: p. 4]. Table 4 shows the




(Adjusted to 1988 $ U.S. millions)
YEAR AMT YEAR AMT YEAR AMT
1953 - 1964 26 1977 205.6
1951 - 1965 24 1978 222
1953 - 1966 23 1979 786
1954 7 1967 42 1980 720
1955 24 1968 45 1981 953
1956 22 1969 45 1982 865
1957 20 1970 46 1983 625
1958 20 1971 41 1984 860
1959 19 1972 41 1985 835
1960 18 1973 43 1986 786
1961 22 1974 52 1987 1365
1962 20 1975 96 1988 1050
1963 21 1976 62
*Compiled from: World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers 1963-1973 (Washington,D.C.: USACDA, 1973), World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1967-1976
(Washington,D.C.: USACDA,1976), World Military Expenditures
and Arms Transfers 1988 (Washington,D.C.: USACDA,
1989). FBIS, Near East and South Asia, 14 April 1988,p. 6.
The level of arms transfers can also be tied to the
level of hostilities between Afghanistan and its neighbor,
Pakistan. The inroads that the Soviets were making in the
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military's officer corps also gave rise to the growing
Communist organization in the nation and its eventual
rise to power. Figure 4 is a graph that shows the total
amount of arms transferred over the course of the case's
time period.
Figure 4*
1950-1988 Total Arms Transfers
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2. Internal Threat
The period from 1950 to 1970 saw little
organized internal threats to the government of Afghanistan.
King Zahir Shah reigned from 1933 to 1973 [Ref. 1: p. 29;
Ref. 7: p. 1]. Most all of the power of government was in
the hands of the Prime Minister,Mohammed Daoud,froin 1953 to
1963. Daoud, in 1953 opened the doors to Soviet aid and
subsequently aligned the nation to the Soviet Union [Ref. 4:
p. 84].
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With the influx of military and economic aid in
1953, the Soviets realized that direct military involvement
in the country was unnecessary and impractical to counter
internal and external threats to the Daoud regime [Ref. 4:
p. 84]. Khrushchev realized that there were no incentives
for an armed Soviet invasion [Ref. 4: p. 84; Ref. 5:
560]. Some of the disincentives for direct military
involvement,as perceived by the Soviets, were: the Afghan
position among non-aligned Islamic states; Soviet
sensitivity to being labeled an invader; and the ruggedness
of the Afghan terrain rendering occupation of the country
difficult and costly [Ref.4: p. 84]. These reasons would
foreshadow Soviet difficulties with respect to countering
the future insurgency.
Realizing the growing influence of the Soviet Union
in Afghanistan, the reform minded Daoud was forced to
resign. The complacent King Zahir Shah took over government.
In 1963 a long period of instability followed with the
formation of the Communist political party,the People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) [Ref. 1: p. 3 2 ; Ref.
3: p. 14].
Opposition to the Marxist government started after a
major revolt in the province of Nuristan in the summer of
1978. This revolt grew instantly as an armed insurgency.
Most Afghans were now opposed to the Marxist reforms which
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ran counter to the growing Islamic fundamentalism in the
region. Deep rooted Islamic traditions and fundamentalism
also surfaced among members of the PDPA. This created
factionalism within the government. [Ref. 7: p. 4; Ref.8]
After a series of political assassinations and
jockeying for power, the Soviets installed Babrak Karmal in
December of 1979 shortly after large numbers of Soviet
airborne forces captured Kabul [Ref. 8: p. 4]. The Soviets
invaded partly because they perceived that the Afghan
government would not be able to survive the growing
insurgency without direct military presence [Ref. 3: p. 19].
The Afghan insurgents, known collectively as the
"mujahidin," have grown in organization, resolve, and
firepower since the Soviet invasion of 1979 [Ref. 9]. In
the years since the invasion, the Kabul regime and the
Soviets have been unable to control areas outside the
capital city [Ref. 10]. At the peak of Soviet occupation,
the 120,000 troops equipped with the most modern weapons
could at best only maintain a stalemate with the insurgents
[Ref. 11]. The most massive amounts of Soviet military arm
transfers to Afghan,.stan corresponded to the years of Soviet
occupation.
After the expense of massive amounts of resources
and casualties, the Soviets started to withdraw its forces
in May of 1983. Under the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan, the
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Soviets agreed to withdraw all of its forces by February of
1989 [Ref. 121. During the entire evacuation there were
still large-scale combat operations between Soviet and
insurgent forces [Ref. 12].
With the almost complete withdrawal of Soviet combat
forces from Afghanistan in February of 1989, the rebels
continue their armed struggle against the Soviet-backed
regime of Najibullah [Ref. 13]. In many ways the situation
parallels the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The Mujahideen
receive large amounts of military assistance from the U.S.
The rebels use high-tech weaponry and the terrain to their
advantage. Like the regimes in Saigon, the Kabul regime,
even with massive amounts of Soviet arms and aid, still has
no real control over the countryside. In fighting the
insurgency, the Soviets have failed to yield to their own
warnings and apprehensions about direct combat involvement
realized long ago in 1954.
3. External Threat
The greatest external threat to Afghanistan has been
from its neighbor, Pakistan. Soviet influence in Afghanistan
increased during the 1950's because of the Pushtun issue.
Prime Minister Daoud's efforts to establish a Pushtun state
along the Afghan-Pakistan border resulted in border clashes
and tension between the two Islamic states [Ref. 1: p. 24;
Ref. 8; Ref. 14].
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After the Eisenhower administration rejected the
Afghan government's urgent requests for aid, the Daoud
regime turned to the Soviet Union. This turn toward the
Soviet Union was given further impetus when the United
States decided to send military and economic aid to
Pakistan, a nation that joined the South East Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and the Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO) in 1955. The Afghan government viewed
the United States as clearly taking the side of its enemy.
[Ref. 1: p. 24; Ref. 15]
During the period of the 1950's and the 1960's the
Soviets capitalized on the threat of Pakistan in order to
gain inroads and to directly influence the Daoud and
subsequent Kabul regimes [Ref. 4; p. 84; Ref. 16]. The
influx of Soviet military equiment and training during the
1960's and 1970's enhanced the capabilities of the Afghan
armed forces against possible aggression from Pakistan [Ref.
17: p. 4].
During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan tension
between the Afghan government and the Pakistanis persisted.
Pakistan became the destination of countless refugees. Many
border areas inside Pakistan served as small bases for
Afghan insurgents and most importantly as supply depots for
weapons from the West [Ref. 17: p. 16-18].
Under United Nations mediation the Pakistan-Afghan
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peace accord was signed in April 1988. After six years of
indirect talks the two nations with the U.S. and the Soviet
Union agreed on the accords. Two of the four main clauses
cover the voluntary return to Afghanistan of its refugees
and a bi-lateral agreement on mutual non-interference and
non-intervention. Even after the Soviet withdrawal of
troops in February 1989, the insurgents have continued to
use areas along the Pakistani border for bases of operations
and access to military supplies from the U.S. [Ref. 18, 19]
4. Regime Stability
The period of the 1950's saw the beginning of Soviet
involvement in the Afghan government. The regime of Prime
Minister Daoud secured Soviet military and economic
assistance that continued to grow as the Soviets increased
their inroads in the Afghan government. Daoud was a
reformist and nationalist who favored the establishment of a
Pushtun state along the Pakistani border. This resulted in
the increase of clashes and tensions with the U.S. backed
Pakistan government. Daoud was eventually dismissed by King
Zahir Shah in 1963. [Ref. 6: p. 4]
King Zahir promulgated a new Constitution in 1964
that liberalized much of Afghan politics and eventually led
to a long period of political instability under the King's
New Democracy" [Ref. 17: p. 6]. Zahir's attempt at
democracy produced few lasting reforms but resulted in the
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evolution of various left-wing Marxist groups and right-wing
Muslim fundamentalists factions [Ref. 17: p. 6]. The
Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)
formed in 1965 [Ref. 8: p. 4]. The period of the late 1960's
saw the emergence of the Communist PDPA with the backing of
the Soviets [Ref. 20].
The early 1970's found Afghanistan in economic ruin
and political chaos. The regime of King Zahir was
ineffective and corrupt. In a near bloodless coup former
Prime Minister Daoud seized power on July 17, 1973. Daoud
abolished the monarchy, abrogated the 1964 constitution, and
declared Afghanistan a republic with himself as President
and Prime Minister. [Ref. 8, 21, 22]
The Daoud regime did little to achieve economic
reforms or maintain political stability [Ref. 17: p. 6; Ref.
21, 22]. In April 1978 with firm backing of the pro-Soviet
Afghan officer corps, Daoud was assassinated in a bloody
coup [Ref. 21, 22]. Daoud had increasingly sought to loosen
the ties formed by Moscow's growing military and economic
assistance [Ref. 22, 23]. The government was now under the
control of the Communist PDPA leader,Mohammad Taraki who
immediately established the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan [Ref. 17: p. 8; Ref. 22, 23].
Even though the government was under the control of
the Communist PDPA,factions grew within the party. The PDPA
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was increasingly plagued with widespread mutinies and
desertions in the Afghan army. The loyalties of the officer
corps was split between Taraki and his rival, Hafizullah
Amin. In September 1979, Amin murdered Taraki and purged the
government of all of his followers. [Ref. 1: p. 17; Ref. 17:
p. 8; Ref. 24]
Established in early 1975, a small band of Afghan
Fundamentalists formed the Afghan Resistance [Ref. 17; p.
8]. The insurgency spread throughout the countryside. The
Afghan army was faced with nothing less than a civil war by
September of 1979[Ref. 1: p. 52; Ref. 24, 25]. The survival
of the regime depended on Soviet military equipment and
advisers [Ref. 8].
The Soviet invasion occurred on the night of
December 24, 1979 with the landing of large numbers of
Soviet airborne forces in Kabul [Ref. 26]. On December 27
Amin was killed and Barak Karmal was placed in power [Ref.
26]. In a real sense,the Soviet invasion and take over
of the government was evidence that arms transfers had
failed to ensure regime stability. No matter who the Soviets
placed in power, the regime would not survive without an
invasion of Soviet forces [Ref. 1: p. 91].
In May 1986, Babrak was replaced by Najibullah,
f. :rcr chief of the Afghan secret police [Ref. 8: p. 4; Ref.
27]. In May of 1986, with ever increasing arms transfers
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from the Soviet Union, the insurgency still controlled the
countryside [Ref. 281. Arms transfers to the Kabul regime
ensured Soviet control of the Afghan armed forces.
The Soviet forces in Afghanistan reached over
120,000 combat troops. Soviet forces withdrew combat forces
by February 1989 but large scale fighting was still taking
place throughout the country between government forces and
insurgents [Ref. 13]. In early March of 1989, Najibullah
survived a failed coup attempt launched by his Defense
Minister, General Tanay [Ref. 19, 291.
Soviet arms transfers parallels the U.S. involvement
in Vietnam. Early in the involvement, arms transfers
allowed the Afghanis to fight the rebels. Later came the
"Sovietization" of the war. After the Soviet withdrawal,the
war was back in the hands of the Kabul regime.
5. Case Assessment
The period of the 1950's saw the emergence of Soviet
arms transfers in response to Afghan request for military
assistance to counter the external threat from Pakistan. The
amount of arms transfers were consistent throughout the
1950's to the mid-1960's. The Soviets continued to gain
inroads in all aspects of Afghan government and in
particular, its officer corps. The internal threat rose
dramatically during the Soviet occupation of the country
during the 1980's. The Najibullah regime continues to face a
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potent insurgency, factionalized military, political
opposition, and a weak economy. The internal threat is
categorized as high.
Historically, Afghanistan's external threat has been
from its neighbors, Pakistan. The dispute between the two
neighbors has been over boundaries and ethnic territories.
Both nations signed a peace accord in 1988 but Pakistan
border areas continue to be used for insurgent bases of
operations and as a supply route for arms from the West.
Direct military confrontations on a large scale is unlikely
between the Afghans and the Pakistanis. The overall
external threat is categorized as low.
Ironically, the man who opened the flood gates for
Soviet military and economic aid in 1953 was killed in a
coup backed by the Soviets in 1978. The emergence of the
Communist PDPA eventually secured the Soviet foothold on the
Afghan government. But the PDPA was plagued with
factionalism and ineffectiveness in government. The Marxist
orientation of the PDPA with its programs and reforms has
run contrary to traditional Muslim Fundamentalists. No
regime has been able to unite the nation and achieve any
kind of lasting economic or social progress. Each regime
supported or placed into power by the Soviets has faced the
same --oblems of instability. The overall regime stability
is categorized as low.
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B. VIETNAM (1976-1989)
In the years immediately following the fall of Saigon
in April of 1975, the Soviet Union and the new unified
Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) moved toward closer
relations. Throughout the years of Vietnam's struggle
for conquest of the south, the Soviet Union supplied the
Hanoi regime with enormous amounts of military and economic
aid [Ref. 30: p. 1801. The relationship that has evolved
from that support has been based mainly on Soviet
opportunism and Vietnamese dependence [Ref. 30: p. 82].
Moscow's postwar motives in Indochina have been intended
to serve a broad scope of strategic objectives. The Soviet
Union wants to bind Vietnam in a firm alliance to ensure
long term returns from its huge military and economic aid
investments. In this regard, the primary objective of the
Soviet Union's support for the maintenance of regime
stability in Hanoi is to counter Chinese influence and
hegemonism in Southeast Asia [Ref. 30: p. 67; Ref. 31: p. 4;
Ref. 32: p. 1].
The Soviet Union's relations with the People's Republic
of China (PRC) has often been turbulent and hostile.
Much of the hostilities center around border disputes along
the Amur river in the northeastern part of China. Both the
Soviets and the Chinese invest large numbers of personnel
and materiel in defending these borders. The Soviets seek to
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make the SRV strong both economically and military. By doing
so, the Soviets hope to make a reliable and formidable ally
of the SRV. The SRV with the fourth largest standing army in
the world is strategically located on the PRC's southern
flank. [Ref. 32: p. 7]
1. Arms Transfers
The Soviet Union, along with the PRC and other
Communist nations, has been Hanoi's source of weapons since
the days of the struggle against French colonialism [Ref.
33]. Since the end of the Vietnam War the Soviet Union has
continued to be the SRV's main source of arms. Table 5




(In 1989 $ U.S. millions)
YEAR AMT YEAR AMT YEAR AMT
1976 157 1981 1447 1986 2279
1977 183 1982 1729 1987 1249
1978 684 1983 1784 1988 1050
1979 5347 1984 1835 1989 534
1980 3315 1985 1671
*Compiled from: World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade
1988 (Washington, D.C.: USACDA, 1989). FBIS, East Asia,
15 March 1990.
The levels of arms transfers saw a dramatic increase
with the 1979 peak. This peak corresponded to Soviet arms
transfers for the support of SRV's invasion of Kampuchea and
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the SRV's brief but intense border war with the PRC [Ref.
34]. Both events occurred in the opening months of 1979.
Figure 5 is a graph showing the trend in the total amounts
of arms transferred over the course of the case's time
period.
Figure 5*
1976-1989 Total Arms Transfers
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2. Internal Threat
The SRV's major internal problems are closely
related to its economic and political problems [Ref. 31: p.
8]. The Hanoi regime won their thirty year struggle in the
Vietnam War because they were able to mobilize the entire
population for their cause. But since their victory the
Hanoi regime has failed to receive the full backing of the
people, particularly those in the south [Ref. 31: p. 8].
The primary internal threat to the Hanoi regime has
60
been the the country's disastrous economic condition [Ref.
35: p. 9]. The people's feelings and behavior have had an
important impact on the entire situation. Thousands of
Vietnamese, particularly from the south, have risked their
lives to leave the country at any price. Others have joined
a small but unorganized armed resistance movement against
the Communist government within the country [Ref. 31: p.
11]. Dissatisfaction and disillusion about the Communist
regime along with the lack of incentives have been and
still are among the major causes of the Hanoi regime's
failure to achieve economic progress [Ref. 32: p. 15].
Soviet economic aid and the Hanoi regime's
implementation of development plans may curb in the long run
the growing internal hostility. The Hanoi regime continues
to maintain a firm hold on all political power. Unlike the
old Saigon regime, the government in Hanoi maintains
control of the entire country not just the areas surrounding
the capital.
3. External Threat
The period that represented the largest amounts of
Soviet arms transfers corresponded to the SRV's armed
conflicts with their two greatest external threats:
Kampuchea and the PRC. Both of these major conflicts
occurred in early 1979.
The government of Kampuchea under the Khmer Rouge
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maintained deep rooted and historical animosities against
the Vietnamese. Apart from ethnic and historical conflicts,
Kampuchea and the SRV had acute differences over border
demarcations, off-shore island claims, ideological
conflicts, and the massive influx of refugees into the SRV
due to the atrocities of the Pol Pot regime [Ref. 36: p.
211.
The government of Kampuchea, backed by the PRC,
conducted major clashes along the border against SRV forces
throughout the late 1970's. By January of 1978, Vietnamese
troops had penetrated to within sixty miles of the
Kampuchean capital of Phnom Penh, but soon withdrew partly
due to threats of direct PRC retaliation [Ref. 37].
On 25 December 1979, led by twelve divisions fully
equipped by the Soviet Union, the SRV launched a blitzkreig
into Kampuchea and by 4 January captured Phnom Penh and
forced out the Pol Pot regime [Ref. 38]. The SRV placed
into power Heng Samrin backed by an occupation force of
nearly 50,000 troops [Ref. 39].
Tension along the SRV-PRC border were high during
the entire time leading to the SRV invasion of Kampuchea. In
a major threat to the Hanoi rcgime, the PRC decided to
"teach" Vietnam a lesson after SRV troops forcefully
displaced Peking's ally from Phnon Penh [Ref. 36: p. 23;
Ref. 40; Ref. 41: p. 2]. On 17 February the PRC launched a
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five-pronged attack along the PRC-SRV border with 300,000
troops [Ref. 41: p. 18]. The PRC greatly underestimated the
strength of the Vietnamese military [Ref. 42]. The PRC
believed it could capture Hanoi in one week [Ref. 42]. On 16
March the PRC began its withdrawal of troops from inside
Vietnam. Though sources vary somewhat,in nearly a month of
fighting the PRC suffered 26,000 troops killed in action
while the SRV lost some 30,000 troops [Ref. 43]. The major
reasons for the PRC's withdrawal were the realization of
the enormous costs of a protracted war with the SRV both
economically and politically, and the realization that
little could actually be achieved by "taking Hanoi" [Ref.
41: p. 24]. Border tensions between the PRC and the SRV
remained high through 1989.
Since the occupation of Kampuchea in 1979, the major
external threat to the Hanoi regime remains the long
insurgent war with rival guerrilla factions seeking the
liberation of Kampuchea. From the invasion of 1979 until
the first troop withdrawals in early 1988, the SRV has lost
some 55,000 troops killed in action [Ref. 44]. Vietnam in
Kampuchea has been likened to the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan [Ref. 45]. The occupation is a "no-win"
situation in the military sense and imposes a tremendous
econonic drain nn a nation that can not even provide for its
owan development [Ref. 45]. Though the SRV has announced
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the eventual withdrawal of its occupation forces, fighting
continues in Kampuchea [Ref. 46].
4. Regime Stability
The period after the Vietnam War saw the most
dramatic rise in Soviet arms transfers to the unified
Vietnam. The direction of the leadership in Hanoi had not
changed a great deal since the earliest days of the struggle
against French colonialism. The ruling leadership has been
exceptionally stable [Ref. 35: p. 2].
Since World War iI there has been no purge in the
ranks of Hanoi leadership. The binding force of the
revolution was thought to be the dominant influence of Ho
Chi Minh and that his death might cause the loss of internal
cc>lerence and external credibility. As of 1989 the Hanoi
regime continues to be united and stable. [Ref.35: p. 4;
Ref. 32: p. 14]
The Vietnam government can not survive without
massive doses of foreign economic and military aid mainly
from the Soviet Union [Ref. 32: p. 15]. By taking advantage
of Hanoi's dependency, the Soviets can achieve their long
term strategic and political interest in Southeast Asia
[Ref. 47]. In providing the SRV with increased military and
economic aid during the invasion of KampucheF, the Soviets
supported the Hanoi regime against the threats posed by the
PRC backed Pol Pot regime [Ref. 48]. At the same time Soviet
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interests were served by putting a check on Chinese hegemony
in Southeast Asia [Ref. 48].
In November of 1978 with the signing of the Treaty
of Friendship and Cooperation, Moscow secured a
strategically valuable ally on China's "soft" southern flank
[Ref. 32: p. 7;Ref. 36: p. 25]. Soviet arms transfers
during the PRC-SRV border war of 1979 helped to ensure the
survival of the Hanoi regime which faced possible
destruction from a two front war with the PRC and Kampuchea
[Ref. 34].
The Soviets through 1989 continued to supply Vietnam
with relatively large amounts of military and economic aid
[Ref. 491. Arms tranfers peaked in 1979 and 1980.This aid
was intended to ensure the survivability of the Hanoi regime
against the continued threat posed by the Kampuchean
insurgents and the continued tensions along the PRC-SRV
border [Ref. 49, 501.
5. Case Assessment
Soviet arms transfers and massive economic
assistance following Hanoi's victory in the Vietnam War
helped to ensure the survival of the regime. The major
internal problem faced by the Hanoi regime after unification
is the struggle for economic development. This remains
Vietnam's main inL-';nal problem. There is little organized
political opposition to the Hanoi regime. The government is
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in firm control of the nation's politics, economics, and
military establishment. The overall internal threat is
categorized as low.
The major external threats come from Vietnam's
historical enemies: Kampuchea and China. The SRV
successfully invaded and placed into power a puppet
government in Kampuchea. The SRV continues to fight an
insurgent war in Kampuchea. The war is a tremendous
economic and military drain on Vietnam. The SRV
successfully repelled an invasion from the PRC. Border
disputes and political tensions persist with the PRC. The
external threat is categorized as high.
The direction and leadership of the Hanoi regime has
changed little since the earliest days of the Vietnam War.
There has been no major purges within the ruling party.
There is no significant factionalism within the regime. The
regime has been coherent and stable throughout the period.
The government maintains firm control over the countryside,
politics, economics, and the military. The overall regime
stability is categorized as high.
C. NICARAGUA (1979-1989)
The triumph of the Sandinista revolutionaries in 1979
over the U.S.-backed Somoza regime in Nicaragua signaled a
milestone in what Moscow perceived as the progressive
transformation of the Caribbean basin [Ref. 51: p. 12]. It
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was a Marxist-Leninist triumph over U.S. hegemony in the
region perhaps equal in importance to the victory of Fidel
Castro in Cuba [Ref. 51: p. 12; Ref. 52: p. 138].
From the earliest days of the Sandinistas' armed
guerrilla struggle against the Somoza regime, Soviet support
was closely linked to Cuban support. Nicaragua had become "a
satellite of a satellite of the Soviet Union" [Ref. 52: p.
209]. Both Moscow and Havana had close relationships with
the revolutionary government of Nicaragua. The Soviet
government was constrained by their own overextended
economic situation and by the realities of geography [Ref.
53: p. 623]. The support of the revolutionary struggle in
Nicaragua was vital to long term Soviet interests in the
Caribbean and to achieve this it was necessary for the
Soviets to maintain the stability of the Sandinista regime
[Ref. 54: p. 48].
1. Arms Transfers
The Soviet Union, Cuba, and other nations
have supported the Sandinista regime with arms transfers
since they overthrew the Somoza government in July of 1979
[Ref. 55: p. 125]. The general trend of arms transfers
throughout most of the period of the 1980's shows a steep
rise.
In 1981 relations between the Sandinista government
and the United States deteriorated rapidly as the U.S.
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government perceived the spread of Communist revolution in
Central America by the Soviets through the Nicaraguans and
the Cubans [Ref. 51: p. 2]. As Nicaragua become
increasingly alienated by the U.S., Soviet arms transfers
grew [Ref. 51: p. 21]. Table 6 shows the amounts of arms
transfers in each year of the case's time period.
Table 6*
1979-1989 ARMS TRANSFERS
(In 1989 $ U.S. millions)
YEAR AMT YEAR AMT
1979 7.3 1985 300
1980 14.7 1986 623
1981 210 1987 525
1982 186 1988 326
1983 333 1989 200
1984 403
*Compiled from: World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers 1988 (Washington, D.C.: USACDA, 1989). FBIS,
Latin America, August 1989. FBIS, Latin America, 29
February 1990, pp. 27-28.
The period of the mid-1980's saw the highest levels
of Soviet Arms transfers. This time period corresponded to
the growing strength of the insurgent groups within
Nicaragua fighting the Sandinista regime.Tensions in Central
America were mounting during this period. The nearby nation
of El Salvador with its U.S. backed regime was in the midst
of a civil war. The Central American region was becoming
a battleground of East-West rivalries. Both the U.S and the
Soviet Union were backing regimes against insurgents and
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elsewhere were backing insurgents against regimes. The
Sandinista regime was the only Marxist-Leninist government
in power in Central America. Its survival depended heavily
on Soviet and Cuban economic and military support. [Ref. 55:
p. 51]
Figure 6 is a graph showing the trend in the total
amounts of arms transfers over the course of the case's time
period.
Figure 6*
1979-1989 Total Arms Transfers
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America, August 1989. FBIS, Latin America, February 1990.
2. Internal Threat
The Marxist Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN) had been fighting a guerrilla war against the Somoza
regime since 1962 [Ref. 36 p. 3]. A massive uprising with
heavy fighting led by the FSLN managed to overthrow the
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Somoza regime on 19 July 1979 [Ref. 57]. The FSLN
immediately formed a coalition government comprised of civic
leaders, leaders of guerrilla factions, and leaders of the
FSLN [Ref. 58]. The government was organized into a
five-member junta, a nineteen-member Council of Ministers,
and a thirty-three member quasi-legislative National Council
[Ref. 58]. The government was in the control of the
Sandinistas. They promised free elections, economic
improvement, and social justice [Ref. 571.
The government under the FSLN soon ruled with
exclusive control of the military, police, and internal
security forces. In 1980 there was a growing organized
opposition to the Sandinista regime. This opposition grew
throughout the countryside. Much of the opposition was being
organized by exiles in Honduras and were backed by the U.S.
[Ref. 591.
The Soviet Union officially recognized the
Sandinista government in October of 1979 and immediately
pledged its support for the regime [Ref. 6u]. As
U.S.-Nicaraguan relations became increasingly tense, the
Sandinistas relied more on Cuban-Soviet support [Ref. 61].
In October of 1980 the U.S. ceased all economic and military
aid to the government of Nicaragua, partly because the
.an-inista regime was pro-Soviet and supported guerrilla
activities in El Salvador [Ref. 59].
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The major internal threat to the Sandinistas came
from the unified armed guerrilla factions collectively known
as the "Contras." The Contras operated from bases inside
Honduras and were supplied by the U.S. [Ref. 62].
Throughout the 1980's large-scale Contra attacks on the
Sandinista forces grew. Nicaragua was plagued with
increasing incidents of sabotage on it few industrial sites
and government forces were constantly attacked in the
countryside [Ref. 63].
Political turmoil within the government also
increased during the period. The Sandinistas could not
deliver to the people its promises for progress. Free
elections did not occur as promised. Stifled by FSLN
manipulation, violence, and threats most political
opposition parties withdrew from the 1984 elections [Ref.
56: p. 4]. The Sandinista leader, Daniel Ortega declared
victory in the election and immediately proceeded to
restructure the government into a one-party Communist
society [Ref. 64].
With the no hope for economic progress, a growing
insurgency, increased political opposition, and growing
pressure from the U.S. and other nations to settle the civil
war in Nicaragua, Ortega agreed to free elections in
February 1990 [Ref. 65]. With the Soviets agreeing to accept
the reslilts of the free election, Ortega acknowledged his
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defeat to Violeta Chamorro in February 1990 [Ref. 66].
3. External Threat
The period that corresponded to the largest amounts
of Soviet arms transfers to the Sandinista regime occurred
at the height of the external threat to the government
of Nicaragua [Ref. 67]. In the period from 1984 to 1986
there were isolated incidents between the Honduran military
forces along the border and the Sandinista forces. There
were also minor clashes with Costa Rican forces [Ref. 681.
The most dangerous external threat to the
Sandinistas was the perception by Ortega that the U.S. would
actually invade Nicaragua with U.S. forces [Ref. 69, 70].
This period saw the deployment of U.S. mines in Nicaraguan
waters [Ref. 71].
During the period of 1984 to 1986 the Soviets
increased their arms shipments to the Sandinistas using a
variety of third-party delivery routes and ships [Ref. 72].
The years following 1987 saw a decreasing trend in the
amounts of arms transfers [Ref. 721.
The was little or no external threat posed by the
forces of Honduras and Costa Rica.The U.S. backed both of
these nations. It was the internal threat and Ortega's
belief of a possible U.S. invasion that were contributing
factors in the Sandinista's decision to negotiate a
settlement of the conflict in Nicaragua [Ref. 55: p. 124].
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4. Regime Stability
The period from July 1979 to February 1990 saw the
struggle for consolidation of power under the Sandinistas.
From the day the revDiutionary government seized power in
Managua, it had to fight to maintain it. Moscow was quick
to recognize the new Marxist-Leninist government and
provided it with vital economic and military aid [Ref. 601.
In September of 1981 the government of Nicaragua
declared a state of emergency after a plot was discovered to
assassinate the junta and the entire FSLN Directorate and
install a new junta made up of former Somoza loyalists [Ref.
73]. During this time there was a rapid increase in armed
opposition to the Sandinista forces throughout the
nation.The insurgents conducted several coordinated attacks
on government forces [Ref. 733.
As the Sandinista forces were increasing their
military strength through Soviet arms transfers, the armed
opposition forces were also increasing their numbers,
organization, and U.S. backing [Ref. 51]. In 1984 the
Sandinistas consolidated their hold on political power by
declaring their candidate, Ortega, the winner of the
revolutionary government's first "free" election. In that
same year the Soviets reaffirmed its support to the
Sandinista regime by declaring ;' would increase economic
and military aid to Nicaragua [Ref. 74]. Again in 1986, the
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Soviets pledged support to the Sandinsitas after Ortega
declared his belief that the U.S. was preparing for a
possible invasion of Nicaragua [Ref. 14].
The mounting internal political opposition along
with an insurgency that had no end in sight, contributed to
the Sandinistas agreeing to a negotiated settlement. The
opposition to the Sandinista government under the leadership
of Violeta Chamorro was elected into office in February of
1990. Central America's only Marxist-Leninist regime was
voted out of office.
5. Case Assessment
1979 saw massive amounts of Soviet arms transfers
for the support of revolutionary struggles throughout the
world. The Soviets were actively supporting the Kabul
government, the Hanoi regime, and the Marxist-Leninist
government of Nicaragua. Soviet arms supplies were vital to
the consolidation of power and the long fight against the
armed insurgency growing within the country. Along with the
armed insurgency the Sandinistas were faced with growing
political opposition, no economic development, and
increasing social unrest. The overall internal threat to
the Sandinista regime is categorized as high.
The armed forces of Honduras and Costa Rica were not
major threats to the Sandinistas. Both were backed by the
U.S. The Sandinista regime did perceive the U.S. as a
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direct threat to Nicaragua and believed that the U.S. could
invade as they did in Grenada. The U.S. backed Contras used
an extensive network of bases in Honduras and Costa Rica to
launch attacks into Nicaragua. The overall external threat
to Nicaragua is categorized as high.
The Sandinistas maintained power in Nicaragua by
keeping full control of the military, police, and internal
security forces. The Sandinistas consolidated power by
declaring their candidate, Daniel Ortega, the winner of the
1984 election. Nicaragua became a one-party Communist state
under Ortega. The period saw a rapid rise in internal
political opposition and factionalism. A failed coup attempt
led by Somoza loyalists sparked the formation of armed
guerrilla groups. The Sandinista regime failed in all of
its piomises to bring social, economic, and democratic
development to Nicaragua. After ten years of massive Soviet
economic and military aid, the Sandinistas were voted out of
office in a free election in 1990. The overall regime
stability throughout the period is categoLized as low.
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IV. COMBINED CASE ANALYSIS
Both the U.S. and the Soviet arms transfers cases have
been presented. Table 7 is a compilation of each case's
level of internal threat, external threat, regime stability,
and the general trend of arms transfers throughout the
the majority of the case's time period.
Table 7
U.S. AND SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERS
FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF REGIME STABILITY
CASE & INTERNAL EXTERNAL REGIME TREND OF
PERIOD THREAT THREAT STABILITY TRANSFERS
U.S./VIET.
1960-1975 HIGH HIGH LOW INCREASING
U.S./PHIL.
1950-1989 HIGH LOW LOW INCREASING
U.S./EL SAL.
1960-1989 HIGH LOW LOW INCREASING
U.S.S.R./AFGH.
1979-1989 HIGH LOW LOW INCREASING
U.S.S.R./VIET.
1976-1989 LOW HIGH HIGH DECREASING
U.S.S.R./NIC.
1979-1989 HIGH HIGH LOW DECREASING
The compilation of the cases show that where the
general trend of arms transfers have increased the
resultinj regime statility has not been high. In the U.S
case of Vietnam, massive increases of arms transfers did not
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ensure the regime's survival. The Saigon regime fell. In
the Soviet case of Nicaragua, massive increases in the
military aid did not prevent the Sandinista regime from
eventually falling in a legitimate election.
Analysis of the cases indicate that the level of the
internal threat had significant bearing on the stability of
the regime. In each of the cases where there was a high
level of internal threat, the case's corresponding regime
stability was low. This relationship occurred even though
the amounts of arms transfers generally increased during the
case's time period.
In most of the cases, the level of direct external
threat did not appear to be as damaging to the regirae as the
level of internal threat. What appears to be significant
is the external threats in the U.S./Vietnam case and the
U.S.S.R./Nicaragua case. In both cases the external threat
is closely linked to the internal threat.Tne Hanoi regime
had maintained close and coordinated operations with the
internal insurgent forces, the VC, against the Saigon
regime. In Nicaragua's case, the internal insurgents were
supported, based, and backed by Honduras, Costa Rica, and
the U.S. All of whom were external thr t to the
Sandinistas.
The case that best illustrates the hts that
inreases in arrns transf(r:- increast-s re -m( stability
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is the U.S.S.R./Vietnam case. The peak of arms transfers
occurred when Vietnam directly confronted their two greatest
external theats: the PRC and Kampuchea. The Hanoi regime
had united the vast majority of their population in a war
against their historical enemies. Of all the cases, the
U.S.S.R./Vietnam case is the only one that shows the ruling
regime faced with a low internal threat. The majority of
the case's time period shows a decline in Soviet arms
transfers to the Hanoi regime.Since the Hanoi regime
maintains a high level of sLability,arms transfers may have
little to do with regime stability to this point.
The U.S./Philippine, U.S./El Salvador, and
U.S.S.R./Afghanistan cases show that where there is a high
level of internal threat and a low level of external threat,
increasing arms transfers is not in itself
sufficient to preserve the regime's stability. It appears
that in these cases, increases in arms transfers do not
solve the problems of poverty, economic decline, social
unrest, political repression, human rights violations, and
military factionalism. These are some of the common
contributing factors in the rise of the internal threat
against the ruling regimes in all of these cases.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined three U.S. and three U.S.S.R.
arms transfer cases to recipient third world nations. Each
U.S. case had a corresponding U.S.S.R. case. The
circumstances of involvement of the supplier to the
recipient nation were similar. The suppliers believed that
arms transfers, or in some cases, direct military
intervention were vital to the survival of the regime. It
was also shown that the supplier had a vested interest in
maintaining the stability of the recipient nation's regime.
The amounts of arms transfers for each year of the
case's time period was recorded. An overall increasing or
decreasing trend for the majority of the time period was
indicated for each case. The level of internal threat,
external threat, and the overall level of regime stability
was determined for each case. The hypotheses set out to
test the proposition that if U.S. and U.S.S.R. arms
transfers increased to a recipient third world nation, then
the recipient nation is likely to see an increase in its
level of regime stability and a decline in its external and
internal threats.
The examination of the si cases indite- tnat
increases in U.S. and U.S.S.R. ari-s traisfers did not
increas. regime stb t Iitv . Additional v l, tle cases_ exained
7 r,
indicated that increases in arms transfers did not
necessarily decrease the level of internal and external
threat to the regime.
There was only one case examined that appeared to
indicate increases in arms transfers helped to ensure regime
stability. The largest amounts of arms transfers to the
Hanoi regime during its invasion of Kampuchea and its
border war with the PRC in 1979 helped to ensure regime
survival against direct external threats. The
U.S.S.R./Vietnam case was the only one examined in which the
regime did not face a high level of internal threat. In
comparing each of the cases, it appeared that when a regime
faced a high level of internal threat, increased arms
transfers did not help to ensure a high level of regime
stability.
The key factor in the level of regime stability appears
to be the regime's level of internal threat. In the long
run, arms transfers do not seem to solve deep-rooted
economic, social, and political problems faced by regimes
tnat give rise to insurgent invements. In each of the cases
where there was a strong insurgent movement, as arms
transfers increased, the insurgent movement also increased
their strength and resolve.
It is suspected that if more U.S. and U.S.S.R. arms
transfer cases were examined the same results would be
80
transfer cases were examined the same results would be
found. In the long run, increasing the amounts of arms
transfers does not increase regime stability. Recent world
events have decreased East-West tensions. Both the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. are facing fiscal realities that would also
indicate decreases in both economic and military aid.
There are many other factors that appear to contribute
to a regime's demise and no amount of arms transfers will
remedy these in the long run. Praetorianism, along with
deep-rooted economic, social, and political problems are
the factors that most likely need to be addressed in order
to ensure a regime's stability in the long run.
So why transfer arms to the Third World? The U.S.
lost the Vietnam War. Its presence is not secure in the
Philippines. The U.S. is reassessing its military support
of El Salvador. The U.S.S.R. has withdrawn from Afghanistan.
The U.S.S.R. has reduced its arms transfers to Vietnam and
Nicaragua as the Soviets have focused their attentions at
improving their own economic condition.Arms transfers at
best provide a regime faced with a potent internal threat a
reprieve. In these situations, arms transfers only serve to
add more shielding to an otherwise fragile and hollow suit
of armor. This question could guide additional research.
Further research could explore the relatonnship betw'een
the specific types of weapons transfers and its
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effectiveness to counter the specific threats to the
recipient nation. Another question that can be examined is
the impact of arms transfers to the escalation of levels of
low intensity conflict in the recipient nation and the
region.
Studying arms transfers, amount trends, and regime
stability along with the supplier-recipient relationship
provides information that can formulate a more accurate
threat assessment of the recipient nation. It can also
gauge the recipient nation's level of military capability
and the level of threat to regional stability. Arms transfer
data is an important element of intelligence that can be
provided to the policy maker. In this regard, the
examination of arms transfers for the maintenance of regime
stability in the Third World indicate that policy makers
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